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Threatened or Threatening?: Securitization of 
the Yemeni Asylum Seekers in South Korea
Eunyoung Christina Choi and Seo Yeon Park
The arrival of many Yemeni people on Jeju Island in 2018 to seek asylum became a 
mega-political issue in South Korea. This article investigates two questions. First, how 
and why have Yemeni asylum seekers suddenly become the focus of securitization 
concerns in South Korea? And second, how have these concerns affected the 
government’s responses? We argue that three key factors—the influence of media on 
the refugee crisis in Europe, the Yemenis’ race, gender, and religious background, 
and South Korea’s internal political and economic situation—have intersected with 
each other and produced the securitization of Yemeni migration. Amidst highly 
contested political debates on the protection of forced migrants in South Korea, the 
state has strictly controlled the border but showed contradictory refugee policies.
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Introduction
In 2018, the dispute over 500 mostly young male Yemenis who entered Jeju 
Island (which is the most popular vacation destination in South Korea) and 
sought asylum became a household topic in South Korea. Since then, the media, 
scholars, civil society, as well as relevant government bodies—both legislative 
and administrative—have been extensively engaged with this issue. Anti-refugee 
protests in the center of Seoul continued for more than three months, followed by 
pro-refugee demonstrations held alongside the anti-refugee protests. In addition, 
a national petition movement against Yemeni refugee acceptance successfully 
secured over 700,000 signatures, and civil groups and government organizations 
hosted several public forums to discuss the potential pros and cons of accepting 
large populations of refugees. Now known as the “Jeju Yemen Incident,” this 
controversy drew unprecedented attention to the subject of refugees in South 
Korea. This “incident” in 2018 was the first of its kind, as South Korea had neither 
seen a significant mass entry of refugees or asylum seekers, nor had a meaningful 
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public discussion of the subject until then.
This phenomenon known as the “refugee crisis,” however, is not unique to 
Korea. The international community, especially Western European and North 
American countries, has led global discourses on the flows of asylum seekers and 
refugees. Specifically, the “securitization” of refugee flows has come to the fore in 
many political debates across Europe and North America. Refugees and asylum 
seekers are often portrayed not only as a challenge to the protection of national 
identity and welfare provision, but also as possible terrorists or criminals that 
can threaten homeland security. People in need of, and worthy of, international 
protection quickly became potential security concerns (Rettberg and Gajjala 
2016; Crawley and Skleparis 2017; Greussing and Boomgaarden 2017). The 
social construction of refugees and asylum seekers as dangerous “others” has 
justified the development of restrictive migration policies. Coupled with a 
concern over regional capacity to host the newcomers, the securitization created 
the “European Refugee Crisis.” Given the divisiveness of the subject, the refugee 
issue has become a meta-issue in politics and a major challenge in Europe (Esses, 
Hamilton, and Gaucher 2017; Greussing and Boomgaarden 2017). 
It is true that the global consensus on attempts to mitigate the impact 
of atrocities in the Middle East, and on plans to engage with humanitarian 
perspectives, has resulted in a more active reception of refugees in countries like 
Canada and Germany. However, not long after more inclusive refugee policies 
were established in some Western countries, backlashes were witnessed as strong 
anti-refugee and nationalist movements gained popularity. Even though countries 
which host the largest numbers of asylum seekers are not Western European 
countries, the international discourse has been largely shaped by the attitudes and 
perspectives of Western countries; accordingly, discussions of national security, 
national/cultural identity, and religion often have xenophobic undertones. In 
the midst of growing security concerns in relation to refugees, less popular 
refugee destinations such as Eastern European countries have also seen a surge of 
nationalist and xenophobic movements (Buchowski 2016; Goździak and Márton 
2018). 
South Korea did not have to engage with the turmoil of the Middle East 
and the difficulties of the neighboring regions until 2018—mainly because of the 
nation’s geographic location, but also because of its less significant status in the 
international community with regard to refugee acceptance. Within South Korea, 
discussions on refugees were only limited to specialists in the field, thus they were 
largely absent from the public eye (Seol 2018, 41). Before the Yemeni incident 
became a nation-wide topic in 2018, even the fact that South Korea enacted an 
independent Refugee Law in 2013 was generally unknown to the public. The 
number of people granted “refugee status” was not significant, and therefore 
concern regarding refugees seemed unnecessary. On a discourse level, both 
conservative and progressive political groups were generally favorable toward the 
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idea of accepting refugees for humanitarian reasons and of taking international 
responsibility to meet the “global standards” established in the decade prior to 
2018 (Cho and Park 2018). Interestingly, when the Korean government granted 
humanitarian stay permits or refugee status to over 600 Syrians in 2015, there 
was little to no society-wide controversy over the asylum seekers from the Middle 
Eastern country, in contrast to the public discourse about Yemeni asylum seekers 
in 2018. 
Thus, this article investigates two questions: (1) how and why have Yemeni 
asylum seekers suddenly become the focus of securitization concerns in South 
Korea?; and (2) how has this controversy affected the government’s responses to 
Yemeni migration and the refugee status determination process in South Korea? 
The securitization of refugees can be examined on two levels: first, as a discursive 
construction of migrants as an external, existential threat; and second, as a policy 
option to tackle that threat (Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998; McConnachie 
2019, 162). This article explores how Yemeni refugees are constructed as threats 
on both the discursive and practical levels. In the later part of this article, it 
also examines the messy features of state migration policies that have become 
apparent through migration control and the process of determining their legal 
status in South Korea. 
The state has traditionally been understood as the major actor that constructs 
refugee policy and refugee status determination, which serves to delineate the 
governing boundaries of the nation-state and define the category of “foreigners 
and outsiders.” However, in this article, we attempt to show that refugee matters 
do not fall solely within the state’s purview; nor are the processes of regulation of 
refugees conducted by state actors alone. Through illuminating the messy features 
of refugee policies surrounding the Yemeni refugees, we argue that the state’s 
policies and practices interact with views and actions of other participating actors 
more intensely under certain circumstances, and it is important to examine 
closely when and where the highly politicized aspect of refugee discourse appears. 
This research was performed between June 2018 and October 2019. First, 
we analyzed archival resources, such as media reports, on-line and off-line 
dialogues from various anti-refugee online spaces, legislative sources, web-based 
announcements, and materials from the Ministry of Justice. Overall refugee 
policy and practices are handled by the Ministry of Justice, so the most significant 
and timely responses were published through the website of the Ministry of 
Justice. During this time period, there were also a number of legislative proposals 
made by members of the National Assembly to suggest stricter border control 
and refugee acceptance practices. We also collected media reports that addressed 
both sides of the controversy in Korea, as well as some news reports that were 
produced overseas, mainly from English speaking countries.     
Second, we collected data through participant observation in the Jeju 
Provincial Government, the Jeju Immigration Services office, two refugee shelters 
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in Jeju, one shelter in Suwon (in Gyeonggi province) and also at the sites of both 
anti- and pro-refugees protests in Seoul. Since we visited the Jeju Immigration 
Services office during the summer of 2018, we were able to feel the tension and 
the burden that the government workers had to shoulder. One government 
officer confessed that he was more tired of Koreans than the Yemenis, as there 
were too many “angry calls” to handle. We also went to a few rallies that took 
place during the summer of 2018. We attempted to examine closely the contents 
of the speeches at the rallies and the demographics of protesters. Every weekend 
there was a large crowd gathering for anti-refugee protests, whereas pro-refugee 
protests came in a little later to counter the arguments posed by anti-refugee 
protests. The participants were mostly from the younger generations, ranging 
from people in their twenties through early forties, and we were also able to 
observe that many people came out to join the rallies with their children. They 
seemed to be quite sensitive to accepting the new comers, as they worried about 
their “safety” and that of their children. We approached some participants for 
interviews, but no one accepted. When we asked who hosts this event every 
weekend, people responded that they did not know. Overall, protesters always 
wore masks (in order to hide their identity) and treated others in a cautious 
manner if those people were deemed “outsiders.”  
We conducted eight interviews: three with government workers and five 
with practitioners from non-governmental organizations (NGO). Of the three 
government officials, one worked for the Jeju Provincial Government, and the 
other two were refugee status determination (RSD) officers. Interviews with 
government officials were rather short and done in a more formal way, as they 
could not freely express their personal opinions. Even with that shortcoming, 
we were able to sense how much of a burden they felt as government officers 
and how difficult it was for them to deal with this unprecedented phenomenon 
given the subject matter was such a politicized and heated topic. As for the NGO 
workers, we interviewed three volunteers who worked at a Christian NGO. These 
three people lived with Yemeni asylum seekers in Jeju and also continued to 
support them after they moved to metropolitan areas on the mainland of Korea. 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted individually. We asked about their 
experiences supporting Yemenis and the public antagonism and resentment 
toward Yemenis they saw in Jeju. Among immigration/refugee support entities 
in South Korea, it is more common to find religious groups supporting the 
refugee population. This is presumably because of the relatively stable funding 
and human resources that the religious community has compared to other civil 
organizations. 
By analyzing the securitization of Yemeni refugee flows through the experi- 
ences of government officials, operational gatekeepers, and both religious and 
non-religious humanitarian workers, we sought to enhance the understanding 
of the securitization of forced migration in a less abstract and more embodied 
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way. We also sought to show how refugee policy is constituted by various actors 
in inconsistent, messy, and interactive ways, rather than being constituted in the 
realm of the state alone, particularly surrounding the Yemeni refugees. 
Securitization of Forced Migration and Euro-Centric Refugee 
Discourses
As Leitner (1995, 259) argues, the borders of nation-states are not uniform 
barriers; instead, they are characterized by varying degrees of openness and 
closure to international migrants. Manipulations of the permeability of these 
boundaries constitute the politics of “admission and exclusion.” The inclusion 
or exclusion of migrants is affected by discourses that construct certain groups 
of migrants as “others” based on their gender, race, class, religion, ethnicity, 
and sexuality. Many scholars have argued that the denial of territorial access to 
undesirable “others” is an essential aspect of the state’s exclusionary sovereign 
power (Bosniak 1991; Torpey 2000; Varsanyi 2008). Consequently, the central 
question that political geographers ask about the state and migration is “whose 
nation?” (Silvey 2004, 492). Nation-states try to constitute a homogeneous nation 
inscribed by ideologies of nationalism and racism (Tesfahuney 1998; Nevins 
2002; Mountz 2010). The process of constructing some migrants as “others” 
privileges particular identities and excludes others by defining the spaces of “us” 
and “them” (Tesfahuney 1998, 505; Silvey 2004, 492-93).
Tesfahuney (1998, 508) explores the question of why certain categories of 
international migrants are placed in a negative discursive field and labeled as 
“threats.” He asserts that this question needs to be examined critically within the 
contexts of global, regional, and local relations of power, gender, race, and class. 
In Western eyes, mass migration flows from the South and East to the North 
have largely been considered as burdens and/or a danger to a host country, and 
migrants with a certain skin color and/or bodily features are considered “carriers 
of ‘undesirable’ qualities and equated with terrorism, drugs, crime or diseases” 
(ibid.). In Western Europe, security discourses that represent migration as a 
danger to receiving states’ domestic integration and public order have developed 
since the 1980s (Bigo 1994; Huysmans 2000). Many people in wealthier countries 
see migration from the global South and East as a threat to prosperity, identity, 
and security. Specifically, within the context of rising poverty and deteriorating 
living conditions in cities, the influx of immigrants, asylum seekers, and refugees 
is portrayed as an invasion, and migrants are conceived as a challenge to the 
protection of national identity and welfare provisions (Huysmans 2000). 
Irregular migrations and flows of asylum seekers have dramatically increased 
in recent decades. This increase has been induced not only by the intensified, 
uneven development in capitalist globalization, but also by political changes, such 
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as the collapse of the communist bloc and increased internal conflicts. In addition 
to cultural and social differences, the ideological resentment that has persisted in 
the post-Cold War period also serves to construct discourses of national security 
and fear. Thus, this kind of migration has often been considered a “putative threat 
to national sociocultural and political fabric” in host countries (Nevins 2002, 10). 
State discourses increasingly frame international migrations as “security threats” 
that affect the safety of citizens and undermine the controlling power of nation-
states (Ehrkamp 2017, 815).
All of these factors influence the ways that the securitization, racialization, 
and criminalization of certain types of international migrants and migrations in 
the host countries are construed. Often, the geopolitical, social, and economic 
power relations between the host and sending countries are manifested through 
these countries’ dealings with regard to migration. Many scholars have also 
observed that in the neoliberal post-9/11 world, border security is generally 
tightened, and the flows of undocumented migration and asylum seekers are 
regulated more closely (Newman 2006; Sparke 2007; Coleman 2007; Varsanyi 
2008; Mountz 2010; Mountz and Hiemstra 2014). In particular, in the post-9/11 
era, immigration control and border enforcement have become widely conceived 
as the basis for the “war on terror” and the cornerstone for the protection of state 
security (Nagel 2002, 972). 
Noticeably in the post-Cold War period, more specifically after 9/11, 
the perceived link between migration and organized Islamic terrorism has 
led many communities to view Middle Eastern people, specifically Muslim 
men, as potential terrorists. While refugees during the Cold War period were 
historically considered moral and political subjects who fled despotic regimes 
or communist countries, more recently refugees from the Middle East have 
become predominantly considered to be potential sources of harm to the host 
country. Between 2011 and 2017, more than 6.3 million Syrians fled their homes, 
accounting for almost one third of the world’s total refugee population (UNHCR 
2018). Among them, almost 429,000 Syrians had applied for asylum in Europe 
by 2013 (UNHCR 2015). Along with Syrian refugees, refugees from Africa and 
the Middle East rushed to Europe, and this influx of migration was initially called 
the “largest humanitarian crisis.” However, as the crisis continued, some political 
leaders in the West raised concerns that asylum seekers are draining the resources 
of their host countries (Beck 2017, 4). Furthermore, the continued terrorist 
attacks in several major cities of Europe by extremist Islamic terrorists between 
the years of 2014 and 2016 reinforced Islamophobia and anti-immigrant rhetoric. 
Under these circumstances, both media and politics have produced inconsistent 
and contradictory discourses and responses (Holmes and Castaneda 2016).
The “European refugee crisis” itself shows a Eurocentric ideology and 
discourse in refugee matters. Byoungha Lee (2018, 47) argues that most refugees 
and asylum seekers reside in countries near their origin countries, and there 
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are severe disparities between the numbers of refugees received by developed 
and developing nations. In 2017, over 85 percent of world refugees resided in 
developing countries, and one third of these refugees were hosted by the most 
deprived countries in the world (UNHCR 2018, 2). The Syrian refugee crisis 
was the first time large populations of refugees reached Europe and applied for 
refugee status (ibid.). As the discourse of the European refugee crisis became 
dominant, the protection of destination countries’ homeland security, rather than 
the protection of displaced people, became a central issue. On a practical level, 
more restrictive methods to tighten borders and control migration have been 
adopted across Europe.
The discourses and practices of securitization of forced migration have 
spread widely across the globe. Nonetheless, very little research on these 
issues has been conducted outside of European and North American contexts. 
McConnachie (2019, 162), who studies forced migration in Malaysia, argues that 
even though securitization of forced migration has predominantly been analyzed 
in relation to Western liberal democracies, this securitization has also become 
the norm in many other refugee hosting sites, including sites of south-south 
migration. This article presents a case study of one understudied area, exploring 
how the discursive construction of forced migrants as threats to security has been 
interwoven with South Korea’s state regulations on Yemeni asylum seekers.
 
The Socio-Political Context of Yemenis Seeking Asylum in Jeju and 
the State’s Responses  
Until 2018, most South Koreans assumed that they would see Yemeni asylum 
seekers only through the international news and that refugee matters would be 
other states’ concern. When Yemeni asylum seekers arrived in Jeju, many South 
Koreans still scratched their heads, wondering how migrants from the Middle 
East could make their way to this distant destination. This was an unusual 
case in the sense that migrants who did not have any cultural similarities or 
personal connections with Korea made a visible influx into Korea in a short 
period of time. Middle Easterners have had a long history of close relationships 
with Southeastern Asian countries, particularly religious ties. Muslim-majority 
countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia have had more experience in exchanges 
of people, culture, and knowledge with the Arab region (Khoo 2014; Mandal 
2014) than other Southeast Asian countries. As Malaysia has become known as a 
successful model of a modernized Muslim country in the Middle East since the 
early 2000s, there has been a surge in tourists and workers coming to the country, 
forming residential communities and “Arab streets” in Malaysia, and thereby 
changing the “social urban landscapes” (Mandal 2014). It is also not uncommon 
for Malaysians to travel to the Middle East for purposes of pilgrimage, study, and 
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work. Due to this close relationship between Arab countries and Malaysia, many 
Yemenis initially fled to Malaysia. 
However, as Malaysia is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and 
does not have a domestic law on refugees, Yemenis cannot seek asylum in 
Malaysia. According to Kirsten McConnachie (2019, 162), Malaysia persistently 
constructs undocumented migrants as “threatening to national security, to law 
and order, to the public, the environment and the economy.” Therefore, Yemenis 
in Malaysia do not have the right to work, attend state schools, or open bank 
accounts. They also can be fined and imprisoned if they are arrested as “illegal 
migrants.” Under the threat of arrest, detention, and deportation, undocumented 
Yemeni migrants in Malaysia have eagerly looked for other countries where they 
could seek asylum.
In this historical and social context, coupled with a growing “Korean wave” 
worldwide (Cho 2010; Peichi 2013), it is not difficult to see why Yemeni migrants 
came to perceive South Korea as an attractive destination, especially since 
Malaysians also see this country as a popular place for traveling, studying, and 
working. Furthermore, as South Korea is one of the few Asian countries to have 
signed the Refugee Convention, it was viewed as a place where Yemenis could 
apply for asylum (Sheikh 2019, 83). These “layered” regional connections and 
multifaceted cultural familiarities made South Korea an appealing destination for 
Yemeni refugees. More significantly, the development of transportation links also 
accelerated this movement: low-fare flights connecting Kuala Lumpur and Jeju 
were launched in December 2017. During that month, a total of eight Yemenis 
came to Jeju and applied for refugee status, though they failed to gain it. With the 
visa exemption arrangement between Yemen and Jeju Island in Korea (with the 
type B-2 visa designed to boost the tourist economy of Jeju), Yemenis could be 
admitted onto the island for thirty days. From then on, within just a few months, 
over 500 Yemeni refugees arrived on the island and applied for refugee status. 
Immigration officers at the Jeju airport were surprised by the sudden 
increase in the number of Yemenis entering the country. Only twenty-six Yemenis 
had entered Jeju Island between 2013 and 2016, followed by fifty-two Yemenis 
in 2017 (Jeju Immigration Service Office 2019, 70). However, between January 
and June, 561 Yemenis entered Jeju, and the number peaked in May (see Table 
1). Among the 129 Yemenis who entered Jeju Island between January and April 
in 2018, only five Yemenis left South Korea and 124 Yemenis applied for asylum 
(ibid., 76). Moreover, while B2 tourist visa holders are not allowed to travel to 
other parts of Korea beyond Jeju, most Yemenis (94 out of 96 who applied for 
asylum between January and March in 2018) changed their residence to locations 
outside of Jeju as soon as they applied for asylum (ibid.). Based on these data, the 
Jeju Immigration Office and Ministry of Justice received the impression that most 
of the Yemeni people entering South Korea on a tourist visa were doing so with 
the intent of requesting asylum and that Jeju had come to serve as a port city for 
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them to enter Korea before moving to the mainland (ibid.). 
How did the South Korean government react to this sudden stream of Yemeni 
migration? On April 30, 2018, the government prohibited Yemeni asylum seekers 
from leaving the island and entering the mainland of the Korean Peninsula. 
This policy was implemented for the purpose of expediting refugee screening 
procedures and for the institutional purpose of alleviating public concerns over 
the “uncontrollability” of this new migrant population. Yemeni asylum seekers 
were trapped on the island until final decisions were made regarding their 
applications. Since the visa they received to enter the country was only valid for 
staying in Jeju, it was deemed not too drastic for the Jeju Immigration Office to 
confine Yemenis to the island.
Along with the confinement of Yemenis in Jeju, the other immediate action 
for regulating Yemeni migration was to change the visa-exemption arrangements. 
On June 1, the South Korean government added Yemen to the small list of 
countries (including Afghanistan, Iraq, and Kosovo) that are excluded from visa-
free entry for visitors to the resort island of Jeju in order to effectively prohibit 
more Yemeni asylum seekers from reaching the country to claim refugee status. 
The visa waiver program to promote tourism on Jeju island started in 2002 
after enactment of the Special Act on the Establishment of the Jeju Special Self-
governing Province and the Construction of a Free International City. Direct 
flights between Malaysia and Jeju were initiated to attract tourists from Southeast 
Asian countries as a way of expanding the tourist market beyond China. The 
majority of visitors to Jeju were Chinese until early 2017. However, the number of 
visitors to the island seriously shrank after China restricted tourism in Korea in 
March 2017 as a means of retaliation in the international dispute over Terminal 
High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) among the United States, China, and 
South Korea. As the Jeju economy is highly dependent on the tourism industry, 
it was important to attract international tourists from other parts of the world. 
However, as the number of the people who entered Jeju through the visa waiver 
program and then applied for asylum increased, and as a response to the anti-
refugee group’s petitions, Yemen was excluded from the visa waiver program 
in the summer of 2018. The South Korean government nonetheless reaffirmed 
that South Korea did not intend to withdraw from the Convention Relating to 
Table 1. Statistics of Yemeni Refugee Inflow into Jeju Island in 2018
January February March April May June
Male 10 14 8 73 406 0
Female 4 10 2 8 26 0
Total 14 24 10 81 432 0
Source: Jeju Immigration Service Office (2019, 71)
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the Status of Refugees, the international treaty that set forth basic international 
obligations toward refugees. Justice Minister Park Sang-ki, however, stated that 
the Ministry would make efforts to prevent false refugee applicants from seeking 
asylum and to make the policy more stable and realistic (Park 2018). 
In brief, these are the sociopolitical contexts that underlie Yemenis’ move- 
ment and entrance into South Korea and the state’s chronological dealings 
with the Yemeni refugees. In the next section, we discuss why and how Yemeni 
migrants received a sudden increase in public attention, even though refugee 
claims by other nationals (such as Chinese, Indians, etc.) have also been made 
in Jeju over the years. Media reports designated the Yemeni refugees as “visible 
others,” linking the refugee issue with Islamophobia and racism. How have 
Islamophobia and racism contributed to anti-refugee movements in South Korea, 
and what other factors have affected the securitization of forced migration in this 
nation?
Fear toward Visibly “Arab-Looking” Men and the Politics of Refugee 
Issues
An article in The New York Times published on July 1, 2018 reported that “South 
Korea has long been intolerant of outsiders, but the outrage triggered by this 
small number of Yemenis arriving on our shores shows how deep xenophobia 
runs here” (S. Koo 2018). Even though The New York Times said that over 500 
Yemenis was small number compared to the numbers of refugees entering 
European countries, this sudden mass of visible others triggered public hostility 
toward Yemeni asylum seekers in South Korea. The anti-refugee petition to the 
Blue House, calling for the removal of refugees and for South Korea to break 
with the Refugee Convention received 700,000 signatories and forced serious 
consideration and response by the Moon administration (Sheikh 2019, 84). 
Online spaces were filled with baseless rumors about the Yemenis and grim 
pictures of European countries dealing with refugees. According to the media, it 
seemed that xenophobia (fear of outsiders) towards Yemeni asylum seekers was 
sweeping across South Korea. 
However, the Yemenis’ efforts to seek asylum was not a completely new 
phenomenon. Yemenis had been immigrating to South Korea since the mid-2010s, 
even before the situation in their home country worsened. However, the arrival 
of large numbers of Yemenis at a South Korean port of entry in May 2018 was 
an unusual and eye-catching event for South Koreans. The Korean government 
had previously granted humanitarian stay permits or refugee status to over 
600 Syrians by 2015. But, at that time, public attention to this issue was scarce, 
generating little significant discourse other than a general consensus that the 
nation should provide humanitarian protection for the Syrians. Considering the 
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overall favorable tone of the limited discourse on Syrian refugees just three years 
earlier, the public reaction to the Yemeni refugees in 2018 took on quite different 
and unexpected character. The xenophobia towards Yemeni asylum seekers 
seemed to eclipse all other political issues in South Korea.  
The reasons why the securitization and refugee determination process 
for Yemeni asylum seekers became a mega-political issue in South Korea are 
highly debatable. We argue three key factors—(1) the influence of news on the 
refugee crisis in Europe and global refugee governance; (2) the Yemenis’ race, 
gender, and religious background; and, (3) South Korea’s internal political 
and economic situation—intersected with each other and produced highly 
contested political debates on the protection of forced migrants. The discourses 
on racism, Islamophobia, and anti-immigrant rhetoric in Western Europe, as 
discussed above, have been echoed in South Korea and reinforced by the Korean 
media. This Islamophobia emboldened by conservative, evangelical Christians 
exacerbated the situation. Yemeni asylum seekers’ demographic characteristics of 
young, Arab-looking, Muslim men and entering in a relatively large mass incited 
fear in young Korean women, and the fact that these Yemenis did not possess the 
“image of refugees” contributed to the younger generation’s anger toward them. 
We argue that the frustrations of the younger generation with contemporary 
South Korean economic difficulty has played a big role in this phenomenon.  
Discourses on Racism and Fake Refugees
Most of the Yemeni asylum seekers who entered Jeju in 2018 were young, tall, 
“Arab-looking” men. The appearance of these young Muslim men, who dressed 
neatly and had the latest model cell phones in their hands, raised concerns 
about “fake refugees” among Koreans. In Koreans’ common perception, refugees 
are Africans, South Asians, and Southeast Asians who are starving and look 
physically weak. However, these Middle Eastern young men looked different. 
Based on their physical appearance, they were considered not as people who 
needed immediate protection but as carriers of “undesirable” qualities, associated 
with radical Islamic terrorism and sexual violence. 
Rettberg and Gajjalla (2016, 179) observe that residents of Western countries 
express the same kind of prejudice regarding refugees and asylum seekers who 
come from the Middle East. They argue that a photograph of a starving African 
child familiar to Western eyes from many charity campaigns contributes to the 
homogenizing imagery of third-world poverty. Compassion is easy when the 
people who look weak are located in geographically remote places; however, 
helping young people who look healthy and wear clothing styles similar to “us,” 
through relocating “them” into “our” neighborhood, is a different story. 
The discourses on “fake refugees” and the securitization of Yemeni migration 
were also strongly connected with South Korea’s political and economic 
atmosphere. Hundreds of people protested in Seoul against accepting Yemeni 
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asylum seekers. During the anti-refugee rallies, the most common banners read 
“fake refugees get out”, while others called for putting “our own people first” (see 
Figure 1). For more than three months, the rallies took place every Saturday 
in the center of Seoul, where large groups of protestors gathered in raincoats, 
sunglasses, and masks. The banners they held spoke loudly and unabashedly 
of how the Yemeni asylum-seekers would wrong the country, presenting these 
migrants as security threats, sex offenders, and job stealers.   
In a recent survey conducted by Hankook Research, respondents in their 
twenties (70 percent) and thirties (66 percent) objected to accepting the Yemeni 
asylum seekers as refugees at the highest rate among all age groups. These results 
suggest that anti-refugee attitudes are more prevalent among young people who 
were raised during periods of comparative economic difficulties. The generation of 
“Hell-Chosun,” which symbolizes the highly competitive, regulated, and stratified 
characteristics of Korean society, tends to show more acquiescence toward social 
discrimination and to take a more conservative stances on minority issues (Oh 
2012; Naim 2016). Economic difficulty and a highly-competitive social environment 
has created frustration among those of the young generations, summed up in 
the term of sampo, which signifies that the young generation has given up on 
three basic desires—relationships, marriage, and children (Maybin 2018). This 
difficulty intensified resentment toward minorities and foreigners, specifically 
“those in need.” 
Park and Cho (2019) argue that a sense of “fairness” is a dominant moral 
motive to the South Koreans in their twenties. As this generation has experienced 
a highly neoliberal and stratified society where individuals are asked to be 
responsible for any circumstances or results, even though those circumstances or 
Source: Photo taken by authors 
Figure 1. Anti-Refugee Protest in Seoul on June 30, 2018
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results are not always under individuals’ control, they are intrinsically sensitive 
to the notion of “gains without pains.” In their eyes, asylum seekers are only “free 
riders” who benefit from the welfare system and taxes that Koreans have paid. 
Judging from what we could hear at the anti-refugee rallies, they not only think 
Yemenis are a burden and/or danger to the welfare system, but also the epitome 
of social “unfairness.” Last but not the least, in the context of the increase in 
taxes and expanding of the welfare system in South Korea during the current 
presidency of Moon Jae-in, Koreans were worried that the entry of refugees would 
further increase their tax burden. It was anti-refugee protestors who put pressure 
on the Moon administration to regulate the forced migration of Yemenis.
Islamophobia
Dr. Park who worked in Yemen for over ten years as a missionary and then 
supported Yemeni asylum seekers in Jeju, described Islamophobia among South 
Koreans in this way:
Whenever I have a chance to give a public lecture on Arab and Muslim people, I 
always ask whether anyone has had direct contact with Arab people in their everyday 
life. Most South Koreans have never even had a cup of coffee with them. Nonetheless, 
they do not have any doubt about the negative images that are circulated about Arab 
people. They even take the incorrect and false information they get from the media as 
truthful and convey those images to other people (Interview with authors conducted 
on October 25, 2019 in Seoul).
As Dr. Park mentioned, South Korean people’s knowledge of Islam and Muslim 
people is constructed mostly through the news and social media, rather than 
actual encounters with Muslim immigrants. Therefore, emphasis on radical 
Islamic terrorism and negative representations of Muslim in the Korean media 
have significantly influenced public fear and hostility toward Islam (G. Koo 2018, 
162). 
Along with the impact of the media, the radical views of Christian groups 
have played a huge role in the creation of Islamophobia in Korean society. Some 
fundamentalist Protestant missionaries warned church leaders and communities 
about the gradual Islamization they perceived as taking place in European 
countries, and they strongly demanded that the Korean church take strong 
measures to block the Islamization of Korean society. The fear of Islamization 
and the negative information on Muslims circulated through text messages, 
social media, and Kakao Talk (a Korean messenger application) group chats led 
to protests against government policies regarding Muslim populations in Korea 
(ibid., 180). During the interview with Dr. Park, he argued that non-Christian 
groups are not interested in Islamization, but Protestant evangelicals used the 
rhetoric of safety to build alliances with non-Christians on immigration issues:
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Protestant evangelicals’ concerns about Islamization in South Korea have not always 
gotten support from Koreans. During the presidency of Park Geun-hye, Protestant 
evangelicals strongly resisted the government’s plan to establish a Halal food industry 
in Korea. The government planned a business-centered approach, but Protestant 
evangelical groups resisted that plan with a religious approach. When the government 
abandoned that plan due to this resistance, non-Christian Koreans said that “Korea is 
not a Christian country” and showed strong antagonism toward Christians. However, 
on the issue of Yemeni refugees and utilizing the rhetoric of safety, Protestant 
evangelicals became friends with other Christian groups and even with non-
Christians (Interview with authors conducted on October 25, 2019 in Seoul).
With strong support from Korean evangelical groups, the anti-refugee 
movement became a nationwide issue. Numerous anti-refugee rallies and 
conferences were organized by megachurches across the country in the summer 
of 2018. Through frequently invoking God and appealing to patriotism using 
alternative news sources on social media, Korean populist church leaders spread 
resentment and stoked fear that the country was in danger of “collapsing” (Choe 
2019). Even though many Protestant groups were actively working to support 
Yemeni asylum seekers in Jeju, South Korea’s conservative church leaders and 
fundamentalist Christian groups have seriously influenced the Korean people’s 
resentment towards Islam and refugees (B. Lee 2018). 
Young Women’s Responses and Fears for Their Safety 
Young women were one of the groups who expressed the most serious concerns 
about safety. They reinforced the myths of Muslim men as potential sexual 
offenders and villains, mostly drawing these stereotypes from a mixture of real 
and fake news (Park 2018). The imagined risk of sexual violence by Muslim men 
prompted some young women to define themselves as feminists and ally with 
anti-refugee activists. “Refugees threaten women” was a common slogan, and 
“Rapefugees” became a hashtag on social media platforms. However, this concern 
for women’s safety based on imagined fears can threaten other marginalized 
people’s survival. This grotesque alliance between feminism and anti-refugee 
movements raised questions about “feminism” in Korea and triggered vibrant 
discussions about “feminism for all” and the ethics of hospitality (Kim et al. 
2019). 
As the media focused on Yemeni asylum seekers in Jeju, six anti-refugee 
organizations in Jeju announced the petition and requested amendments in 
refugee law and the abolition of the visa wavier program (Jeju Immigration 
Service Office 2019, 114). Each day, mothers uploaded hundreds of new posts 
to a website called “Jeju Mom Café,” voicing concerns for their children’s safety. 
The securitizing, racializing, and criminalizing discourses toward Yemeni asylum 
seekers were mainly constructed through online spaces, and local people 
expressed their fear through protests against the settlement of asylum seekers in 
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their neighborhood. As the Yemeni asylum seekers had a hard time finding places 
to stay, humanitarian organizations, religious groups, and individuals started to 
provide shelters, but as soon as the public discovered these shelters, they became 
targets of criticism. 
Min, who worked as a volunteer worker and Arabic translator at a Christian 
NGO which provided shelter in Jeju for Yemeni asylum seekers, remembered 
local people’s protests as follows:
We rented a big, clean guest house in Aewol, one of the popular tourist spots in Jeju, 
on July 22, 2018. The house had ten rooms and a separate bathroom in each room. 
We rented that house for three months. However, once we moved into the house 
with the Yemenis, residents of that village and members of anti-refugee organizations 
demonstrated in front of the house and asked us to move to another place. The 
principal and teachers from the elementary school near the guest house requested a 
meeting, as some parents did not want their children to meet Yemenis on their way 
to school. As we had already paid rent for three months, we persuaded the village 
leaders and school-related people to let them stay. We told the Yemenis the concerns 
of the local people and asked the Yemenis to stay inside. As the refugee determination 
results were announced in mid-October and the Yemenis could leave Jeju, the shelter 
was closed before the three-month contract term ended (Interview with authors on 
November 5, 2019 in Seoul). 
Interestingly, while resentment and antagonism toward asylum seekers con- 
tinuously circulated in the South Korean media, the local people who volunteered 
in shelters and other sites were mostly silent. Soohyang, who worked in the shelter 
as a volunteer with Min, mentioned that local people who showed hospitality 
toward Yemenis were mostly old people, and the young parents and young women 
who asked to close the shelters were mostly migrants who had recently moved 
from the mainland to Jeju (Interview with authors on November 3, 2019 in 
Suwon). Kwon (2019) also observed that Jeju islanders believed that the people 
who opposed refugee acceptance were mainly from the mainland, and Jeju 
residents were influenced by public opinion and became increasingly reluctant to 
accept Yemeni asylum seekers as refugees. She explained that the locality of Jeju 
Island as annexation space has led Jeju residents to perceive this issue differently 
than people on the mainland. It seemed that “even if they do not accept Yemeni 
Muslims, disapproval of them appears to be less apparent on Jeju Island” (ibid., 
35) because of Jeju residents’ memories regarding local history, particularly the 
evacuation and persecution during the 4.3 Massacre,1 and the relatively high 
religious openness (ibid., 33-34).  
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Everyday Practices of Refugee Regulation in a Highly Politicized 
Circumstances
According to Mountz (2010), the ways the nation-states “see” migrants are 
reflected in nation-states’ immigration laws and policies toward them. The legal 
“naming” or “categorization” of international migrants along the spectrum 
from illegal migrants to refugees significantly contributes to the construction 
of the legal and social status of migrants. The way that migrants are understood 
and defined by receiving states affects their security, but it is equally important 
to understand how states’ migration and refugee policies are challenged and 
negotiated by civil society and by migrants themselves at various scales.  
The seemingly inconsistent, contradictory state policies and refugee status 
determination procedures for Yemeni asylum seekers show that the particular 
control Korean government attempted to exercise in cooperation with several 
different actors, as the issue was extremely controversial and divided. As 
discussed so far, there were several factors that induced the politicization and 
securitization of the Yemeni incident. Here in this section, we analyze what was 
involved in the unprecedented refugee policy and will discuss its implications.   
The Yemeni incident was such an important moment to the Moon 
administration, as it happened relatively early in his presidency and people still 
had vivid memories of impeaching previous president Park Geun-hye. As the 
Moon administration came into power pronouncing the “power of citizens” and 
“the candlelight revolution,”2 it could not just ignore the voices of the people, even 
from the conservative side. In the summer of 2018, the Moon administration’s 
approval rate decreased significantly, mainly due to the Yemeni refugee issue (Bae 
2018).  As an administration that prides itself on the restoration and realization of 
“true democracy,” the fact that a number of citizens took to the streets to heavily 
criticize a policy and made a petition that received over 700,000 signatories 
was a clear political burden. In other words, the citizens used the fact that this 
administration cared very much about the support and approval of the citizens to 
leverage their opinion. Then, how did this highly debated and intense process of 
granting refugee status proceed?
First, let us observe the refugee status determination procedure. The Jeju 
Immigration Office expedited the process of refugee status determination in 
response to several different actors’ concerns expressed through different media 
outlets. As discussed earlier, there were diverse voices surrounding the issue, such 
as online mom cafés, street protests, commentaries by scholars and members 
of the National Assembly, and the mass media. These actors agreed on some 
issues and were divided on the others; but overall, they asked the government to 
take prompt action. After seeing interest in the topic grow day by day, the Jeju 
Immigration Office and the Ministry of Justice had to act more urgently. The 
Jeju Immigration Office first set up a Yemeni-specialized refugee application 
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counter, and subsequently a total of 549 Yemenis went through the procedure. 
The Ministry of Justice, which is in charge of refugee and immigration matters 
in South Korea, sent more RSD officers and professional interpreters to expedite 
the process, even though the Ministry still suffers from lack of RSD officers 
nationwide. 
Before the Yemeni incident, the Jeju Office had only one Arabic-Korean 
interpreter at the office, but the number increased to four. The RSD officers from 
other regional Immigration Services Offices were assigned to take care of the 
refugee status determination process. In total, there were ten staff members with 
five RSD officers, four interpreters, one RSD assistant officer—six more staff 
members than usual (J. Lee 2018). As a result, with notification of the result of 
status determination coming out in September, most of the status determination 
processes were completed by the end of 2018 (Heo 2018). This was an unusually 
rapid pace, as the average procedure takes about a year in South Korea (Ministry 
of Justice 2019). This is worth noting, as the Ministry and Local Immigration 
Services were consistently criticized over the extended period of refugee vetting 
(Nancen 2018). As we can see in the statistics provided by the Ministry of 
Justice, the number of refugee applications has soared over the last ten years. 
In 2011, there were only about 1,000 refugee applications, but in 2018, there 
were about sixteen times more refugee applications than that of 2011 (Table 2). 
However, the number of specialized government staff who assess applications 
was unrealistically low, and the structure of refugee vetting was not sufficiently 
efficient or systematic.
As of May 2018, there were only thirty-nine government officials taking part 
in the refugee status determination process, and among them only twenty-eight 
processed the first level assessment (J. Lee 2018). If these officials tried to process 
all the refugee applications in the year 2018, they would have had to assess 
about 50 cases a month. This number looks almost unachievable and it is hard 
to believe that the refugee applications would be processed thoroughly, as one 
official would have to write an assessment report on at least three applicants a day 
which involves scheduling an interview date with an interpreter, pre-screening 
and research, and making a decision (Interview with authors on July 5, 2018 in 
Jeju). With this kind of weak structural support, the refugee assessment cannot be 
done with expected quality.    
Table 2. Number of Refugee Applicants and Admitted Refugees
Year 2011 2014 2016 2018
Number of Refugee Applicants 1,011 2,896 7,542 16,173
Number of Admitted Refugees 42 94 98 144
Source: Ministry of Justice (2020) 
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This practice was criticized because the extended period might reduce the 
protection period for potential refugees and leave them in institutional limbo 
without many rights, and the long period might also affect the result of refugee 
status determination (Kim, Park, and Cheong 2018; Nancen 2018; Interview with 
authors on July 5, 2018 in Jeju). This case shows how a state’s response to various, 
and noticeably unfavorable, voices actually ended up becoming something 
favorable to asylum seekers and agreeable to those who support refugee rights. 
The Ministry had to take some extreme measures as it extracted already-
insufficient human resources from other regions to dispatch to Jeju. Even though 
the Ministry received some criticism over the low rate of refugee acceptance for 
Yemenis’ cases and over the rushed nature of the process under pressure,3 the 
quick manner of the response to the crisis was recognized by some scholars and 
media as a form of “progress” in the protection program.    
Second, the decision to help Yemeni asylum seekers seek employment 
resulted in a positive turn of events. On June 14 and June 28, 2018, the Jeju 
Immigration Office hosted two career fairs with the help of several civil 
organizations, such as the Korean Red Cross and Global Inner Peace, as well 
as fishery and farming businesses (Goh 2018). In order to hold this event, the 
Office contacted individual and organizational shelter providers, as well as news 
media agencies (Interview with authors on July 5, 2018 in Jeju). While false 
accusations continued, dramatizing the Yemenis as “wandering about” the island, 
the National Human Rights Committee demanded a thorough look into refugee 
policies and procedures and suggested a quick and sustainable response in favor 
of the Yemenis. In the midst of high-pitched voices and petitioning by the anti-
refugee groups, the pro-refugee rights groups also garnered support from the 
public and pressured the government to take a more serious and sustainable 
humanitarian approach. Local business people and factory owners needed some 
help at their farms and factories. The Jeju Office held the job fairs to handle the 
various positions described above and in order to provide Yemenis with financial 
stability, as the office’s personnel had noticed that the extended period of stay 
created some homelessness among Yemenis and subsequently brought about 
anxiety and fear among local residents (Interview with authors on July 5, 2018 
in Jeju). The job fairs turned out to be somewhat successful, as the majority of 
Yemenis got jobs and reached some level of financial independence. 
This was also an unprecedented measure for refugee applicants in Korea; 
normally applicants cannot take jobs during the first six months after their 
application is submitted, according to the Refugee Act. The employment of 
Yemenis was accomplished through the actions of many different actors, the pro- 
and anti-refugee groups, the National Committee for Human Rights, business 
owners, local and national governments, local volunteers, and the Yemenis 
themselves. The cries against letting them “roam around” the neighborhood, 
the calls to give them humanitarian means to survive, and the demand in the 
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labor sector all created the environment for a particular policy which made the 
Ministry act in a manner different from before.  
Third, the favorable civil services and actors coupled with Jeju residents 
affected the mobility pattern of Yemenis in South Korea. Nearly half of the 
Yemenis with the recognized statuses are known to have traveled to other parts of 
South Korea to seek better employment and educational opportunities and to get 
connected with other Yemeni communities on the mainland. However, among 
the Yemenis who left Jeju Island after they received refugee and humanitarian 
status, 17 percent later returned to Jeju, according to Do Kyoon Kim, former 
director of the Jeju Immigration Office. He suspected that they returned due to 
the warm weather and nice environment (Goh 2019). According to our interview 
with another immigration officer, the number of Yemenis who returned to Jeju is 
also increasing because of the relative richness of the local support and hospitality 
that Yemenis have received there. Even though there are better job opportunities 
in the mainland, some Yemenis still make their way back (Interview with authors 
on July 5, 2018 in Jeju). Their stories as such are another subject to explore, but 
this observation at least defies our expectations for their movement after their 
status determination, particularly when considering the general perception of 
how the island’s residents had accepted (or rejected) the Yemenis several months 
earlier.     
Finally, as we attend to the overall refugee assessment process, the way in 
which refugee regulations involved participation from diverse governing entities 
on different scales with diverse political measures gives us some insight into how 
refugee policy is constructed. The refugee law enacted in 2013 made it possible for 
Yemeni migrants to apply for refugee status. At the policy level, comprehensive 
visa-waiver programs were launched to boost the international tourism industry 
of Jeju Island, but these programs also brought new challenges, raising public 
anxiety over border security and the island’s hosting capacity. The anti-refugee 
rhetoric, influenced by the Western conservative media, exacerbated by con- 
servative Christians with some religious intentions, and nourished by the current 
socio-economic environment that particularly disadvantages the younger 
generations, construed a noticeable voice in the socio-political arena. The divided 
and heated public debate expedited the refugee procedure, shortening the average 
period of refugee vetting by half, while the young moms, conservative Christians, 
and local residents’ fears of refugee applicants “roaming around” prompted the 
Immigration Office to give special work permits to the Yemenis. 
This somewhat ironic, variegated, and complex scene attests to how the 
refugee governance displayed in the Yemenis’ case is not straightforwardly 
controlled by the state alone. Particularly the young generation’s insecurity 
and resistance toward giving benefits to social minorities, a politicization of 
conservative Christianism, and the political effort made by ‘citizen-centered’ 
government all created an ad-hoc and complex refugee policy for Yemenis.  
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Conclusion 
We have examined the sociopolitical contexts of Yemenis’ movement and 
settlement in South Korea, as well as the procedures of refugee assessment, 
through the lens of the securitization of refugees and the particular mode of 
constitutive refugee policy. Yemeni asylum seekers have faced unfortunate 
reactions from some South Koreans who raised the issue of “national security” 
upon their entering the country. The process of constructing refugees and asylum 
seekers as a group from whom security/protection is needed and as a group who 
threatens “our” security is what securitization of forced migration entails. In 
the South Korean case, the particular character of the current administration, 
Islamophobia formed by politicized and conservative Christian groups, and the 
younger generations’ (and particularly women’s) successful creation of a discourse 
of fear and security assembled a specific refugee policy. 
The state immediately controlled the border to block further entry of 
Yemenis into Jeju by excluding Yemen from the visa-waiver program. However, 
state responses toward the Yemenis who had already arrived in Korea and sought 
asylum were neither uniformly favorable nor antagonistic. Behind the scenes of 
the heated debates, largely influenced by Islamophobia and xenophobia and its 
countering discourses, there were diverse actors participating in the response 
to the refugees’ arrival: anti- and pro-refugee groups who held rallies, shelter 
providers, religious organizations, local residents who embraced or shunned the 
Yemenis, the Yemeni communities themselves, as well as the Jeju Immigration 
Office, the Jeju Provincial Government, and the Ministry of Justice. These actors all 
established a certain mode of refugee regulation over the Yemenis, inconsistently 
and somewhat contradictorily. The 2018 Yemeni incident is still something that 
we can explore more in terms of the subjects of social membership and minorities, 
and national boundaries and security. In terms of refugee policy, the next step for 
South Korean society is how it comes up with an agreeable and sustainable policy 
through meaningful discussions and reflections on our experiences in 2018.
Notes
1. The 4.3 Massacre refers to mass killings of Jeju residents by the South Korean 
authorities between 1947 and 1954.
2. Here, candlelight revolution means the mass protests for the impeachment, and, 
symbolically, a participatory democracy.
3. The government granted only two people refugee status, and they were both 
journalists. It appears to be relatively easier to grant the status to journalists since they 
have many materials to prove their claims. People who are interested in refugee matters 
criticized this result, as it implied that the Ministry did not make a thorough assessment of 
each case.
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